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THE MISPLACED RELIANCE ON DEFAULT RULES IN 
INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
Henry Gabriel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to participate in this tribute to Professor Harry Flechtner. 
It is fair to say that over the last two decades Harry has been the preeminent 
American scholar on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods. To have made such an important mark on such 
an important area of the law is a level of accomplishment that few can hope 
to achieve. Harry’s teaching (he has earned every teaching award possible) 
and his indefatigable work on the Vis Moot Court will be sorely missed. I 
expect, though, we can continue to look forward to more scholarly 
contributions from him for years to come. 
As the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (“CISG”)1 has reached middle age, as the organizers of this 
conference suggest, it may be time to see what lessons we have learned 
during the CISG’s period of growth and development. In this Article, I 
suggest one lesson is that we may get lazy and therefore not expressly resolve 
some issues in the agreement that, left unresolved, may cause parties 
unnecessary litigation or arbitration. If we are thoughtful enough to consider 
a choice of law and a choice of court or arbitration clause, we might also 
address some of the issues that arise from the default terms that would 
otherwise apply. 
I appreciate my suggestion is aspirational in what it may require of 
lawyers drafting agreements. It may be that any proposal for custom 
contracting may be an unrealistic expectation for the bulk of transactions 
governed by the CISG, particularly when one of the functions of the CISG is 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Professor of Law, Elon University. 
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 1, 1980, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 98-99, 1489 U.N.T.S 25567, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/ 
sale_of_goods/cisg [hereinafter CISG]. 
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to provide a set of default rules that are intended to allow parties to avoid the 
fuss of trying to customize every transaction. For the majority of small 
generic transactions, the default rules of the CISG probably serve this 
function well. The possible pitfalls on relying on the default rules of the CISG 
for more complicated transactions, though, may justify the effort to contract 
around some of these rules. 
Contracting parties, and academics that write about this, spend an 
inordinate amount of energy on the question of whether one should embrace 
or disclaim the CISG, when in fact, for most points of possible contention, 
the parties to an international sales contract should be able to rely upon the 
CISG by contracting around the sections that have created the most litigation. 
By doing so, the residual default rules of the CISG should have little impact 
on the resolution of disputes, and therefore, the parties need not disclaim the 
CISG in favor of an otherwise applicable domestic law. 
We know, at least in the United States, that parties routinely exclude the 
CISG,2 or they will attempt to exclude the CISG, albeit unsuccessfully.3 In 
this Article, I posit that parties need not disclaim the CISG to avoid the scope 
and interpretation problems inherent in the CISG. I suggest that parties be 
thoughtful about the effect of either choosing the CISG as governing law or 
having it apply by default and to appreciate some of the interpretive problems 
that might be hidden in this choice. If parties choose this path, they will 
benefit from the CISG by relying on law specifically crafted to effectuate the 
expectations of international sale of goods transactions. 
The first part of this Article focuses on two structural problems in the 
CISG. The first problem is the determination of the scope of the CISG. As I 
will discuss, the ambiguity as to its own scope within the language of the 
CISG can cause uncertainty about the governing law of the agreement. The 
second problem is the lack of clear guidance and standards for the 
interpretation of the text of the CISG. Although I think both of these concerns 
are significant, these concerns can be easily remedied in a well-drafted 
agreement, and therefore they do not, in and of themselves, necessitate the 
exclusion of the CISG in favor of domestic law. 
                                                                                                                           
 
2 John F. Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S. Contract Practice: An Empirical Study, 38 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 195 (2016). 
3 See, e.g., Travelers Property Cas. Co. of America v. Saint-Gobain, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1081 
(D. Minn. 2007). 
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The second part of this Article provides a checklist of the major parts of 
a transaction that, when there is a dispute, the default rules of the CISG have 
often not proven as adequate to provide clear guidance for resolution of the 
dispute. It is these areas that parties should consider drafting around.4 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE CISG 
A. The Ambiguous Scope of the CISG 
The CISG is fairly well drafted, and at a superficial level is easily 
understood. But it actually does very little: “[t]his Convention governs only 
the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the 
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”5 It is the aspects of the 
transaction that the CISG does not cover that raises the first problem. The 
CISG does not cover many areas of sales law, such as pre-contractual 
liability, defects in consent, and the validity of terms. The CISG has no rules 
that govern the rights of third parties to the transactions. Questions about tort 
liability for the goods are avoided in the Convention. There are no rules on 
the law of agency, negotiable instruments, negotiable documents or letters of 
credit—the backbone of international commercial law. The CISG does not 
apply to certain types of goods,6 mixed transactions where a preponderant 
part of the contract is not for the sale of goods,7 as well as security interests 
in the goods. In addition, the CISG does not cover the conclusion of the sales 
contract through an agent, set-off, assignment of rights, limitation periods, 
and possibly the use of electronic communications.8 Thus, a lot of what goes 
on in an international sale of goods agreement will be outside the scope of 
the CISG itself and governed by other law. This is what is generally referred 
to as “external gaps.”9 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 CISG, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-99, 1489 U.N.T.S 25567 (the CISG allows liberal disclaiming and 
modification of its rules). 
5 Id. art. 4. 
6 Id. art. 2. 
7 Id. art. 3(2). 
8 See id. art. 11 (because the CISG has no form requirements, the CISG, by its very terms, provides 
for electronic forms of contracting and communication). 
9 See, e.g., Larry Dimatteo, CISG as a Basis for a Comprehensive International Sales Law, 58 VILL. 
L. REV. 691 (2013); PETER SCHLECTRIEM & INGEBOR SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN SALE OF 
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This is not a minor issue. For example, although it is generally held that 
the validity of standard contract terms are governed by domestic law,10 there 
is a split of authority as to whether they become part of the agreement as to 
be determined by the CISG11 or domestic law.12 Likewise, some courts have 
found that estoppel issues are not governed by the Convention,13 where other 
courts have concluded that estoppel is a general principle of the 
Convention.14 As with many other issues where there has been disagreement 
on the scope of the CISG, there is really no principled basis for choosing one 
view over the other. 
B. The CISG’s Interpretative Guidance to its Scope 
The CISG gives some tentative guidance for the line between “internal 
gaps,” matters covered by the CISG but not answered by it, and “external 
gaps,” matters outside the scope of the CISG: 
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
                                                                                                                           
 
GOODS 132 (Ingebor Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016); Amtgericht Sursee, Switzerland, 12 Sept. 2008, 
www.cisg-online.ch. 
10 See Landgericht Landshut, Germany, 12 June 2008, English translation, http://www.cisg.law 
.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/080612g2.html; see also CLOUT case No. 428 [Oberster Gerichtshof, 
Austria, 7 Sept. 2000], Unilex; see also Rechtbank Zutphen, Netherlands, 29 May 1997, Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht, 1998, No. 110; see also Amtsgericht Nordhorn, Germany, 14 June 1994, 
Unilex. 
11 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Linz, Austria, 23 Mar. 2005, English translation, http://www 
.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/050323a3.html; CLOUT case No. 831 [Hoge Raad, the 
Netherlands, 28 Jan. 2005]; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Germany, 21 Apr. 2004, English translation, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/040421g3.html; CLOUT case No. 592 
[Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Germany, 30 Jan. 2004]; CLOUT case No. 819 [Landgericht Trier, 
Germany, 8 Jan. 2004]. 
12 See, e.g., Rechtbank Arnhem, the Netherlands, 17 Mar. 2004 (stating that issue of the 
applicability of seller’s standard terms and conditions is governed by gap-filling domestic law), English 
translation, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/040317n1.html. 
13 See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 305 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005); 
Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam, Netherlands, 5 Oct. 1994, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
1995, No. 231. 
14 See, e.g., CLOUT case No. 230 [Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, Germany, 25 June 1997] (see full 
text of the decision); CLOUT case No. 94 [Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der 
gewerblichen Wirtschaft—Wien, Austria, 15 June 1994]; CLOUT case No. 93 [Internationales 
Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft—Wien, Austria, 15 June 1994] (see full 
text of the decision); Hof’s-Hertogenbosch, Netherlands, 26 Feb. 1992, Unilex. 
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which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law 
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.15 
For those issues for which the CISG does not expressly provide for, 
there needs to be an initial inquiry whether the issue can be resolved on the 
basis of the “general principles” on which the Convention is based.16 It is 
important to understand the reason for this. If there is an issue, although not 
“expressly settled” by the Convention, but still based on the “general 
principles” on which the CISG is based, then that issue is to be resolved by 
the “general principles” and not by the domestic law (or other international 
law) that would govern that issue under the rules of private international law. 
Therefore, before determining the question of what law applies for 
external gaps, the question of what constitutes “general principles” must be 
resolved. There, of course, is nowhere near a consensus of what constitutes 
the “general principles” on which the CISG is based. A lengthy list of general 
principles can be compiled from commentary, court decisions, and 
arbitration awards; a list too long to attempt to provide here. The point is 
simple: there is uncertainty as to these “general principles.” 
Furthermore, the question of what constitutes the “general principles” 
on which the CISG is based is only the first question in the determination of 
what law applies in these gap areas. If there appears to be no general principle 
derived from the Convention, then a second analysis must be done under the 
forum’s rules of private international law to determine what domestic or other 
international law might apply to these external gaps. 
Therefore, to determine the scope of the CISG, there are two inquiries. 
First, one must ask, “what does the text of the CISG say?” Second, one must 
ask, “what are the ‘general principles’ on which the CISG is based?” Only 
then can one get to the third question of, “what law governs issues outside of 
the CISG—the ‘external gaps’?” However, neither the line between the CISG 
and the “general principles” on which the CISG is based, nor what constitutes 
the “general principles” on which the CISG is based, has any certainty. 
These two levels of uncertainty are compounded by the uncertainty of 
what constitutes the rules of private international law and how these rules 
would be applied. This latter question might be resolved somewhat by a 
choice of law clause. In either a standard form or bespoke agreement, it 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 CISG art. 7(2), Apr. 1, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-99, 1489 U.N.T.S 25567. 
16 Id. 
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therefore behooves parties to put in a choice of law term in the agreement to 
cover all aspects of the transaction to avoid the unnecessary uncertainty as to 
what the governing law will be other than the CISG. 
This choice of law clause should resolve the problem of what other law 
applies, but it does not resolve the question of where the line is that divides 
the CISG from other law. In other words, is the CISG the text alone or is it 
the text as understood by the legions of interpretations that already exist? 
Furthermore, as I will discuss below, the application of private international 
law to resolve external gaps may not be fully clarified by a choice of law 
clause. This is the great onion of the CISG. 
C. The Choice of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts as an Example of Delineating the Scope of the General 
Principles of the CISG 
To provide a concrete example of how fluid the determination of what 
are the “general principles” on which the CISG is based, we can examine 
how courts have interpreted CISG Article 7(2) in light of the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Law.17 This example is apt as there 
is disagreement whether the UNIDROIT Principles represent the “general 
principles” on which the CISG is based.18 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 The UNIDROIT Principle of International Commercial Contracts are designed to be an 
“elaboration of an international restatement of general principles of contract law.” The International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts 2010, at xxii, https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-
2010. Originally promulgated in 1994, new sections were added, and some amendments made in 2004, 
2010 and 2016. I have used the UNIDROIT Principles for this analysis solely as an example of another 
law that would blur the border between the CISG and other applicable law. This analysis is equally 
applicable if the other governing law were a domestic law that filled in the gap where the CISG did not 
apply. 
18 Hof van Cassatie, Belgium, 19 June 2009, English translation, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/wais/db/cases2/090619b1.html; Netherlands Arbitration Institute, the Netherlands, 10 Feb. 2005, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/050210n1.html. Some commentators, see, e.g., 
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, including myself assume that the UNIDROIT Principles 
would be better classified as external gap fillers, if for no other reason than the fact that the UNIDROIT 
Principles were drafted after the CISG, and therefore could not have been a source of general principles 
on which to base the CISG. 
There is some logic, however, to concluding that the UNIDROIT Principles could be treated as a 
source of “general principles” and therefore become subsumed by the CISG itself. If one considers both 
the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles as having been based on previously recognized principles of 
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In this analysis, I am assuming that the parties have not chosen to 
disclaim the CISG, but instead provide a choice of law provision providing 
for the UNIDROIT Principles to govern those issues in the transaction 
outside the scope of the CISG.19 The benefits of this would appear to be 
evident: certainty is important, and probably more important than which law 
applies is knowing which law applies. A choice of law provision avoids the 
uncertainty of the application of private international law to those issues not 
governed by the CISG by providing for a specific law to govern those aspects 
of the transaction not governed by the CISG. This choice of law clause, 
however, might not actually achieve clarity as to the applicable law, nor, as 
I will discuss below, necessarily resolve some ambiguities in the resulting 
applicable default terms of the agreement. 
Convenient for our analysis, UNIDROIT has drafted model clauses for 
use with the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.20 
One model clause directly addresses the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles 
operating simultaneously: 
This contract shall be governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) interpreted and supplemented by the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.21 
                                                                                                                           
 
international commercial law, then they are both derived from similar sources. As such, because the scope 
of the UNIDROIT is broader than the CISG, one might view the UNIDROIT Principles as simply a more 
encompassing articulation of the same general principles underlying both instruments, and therefore, for 
purposes of interpretation of the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles are a source of the general principles 
underlying the CISG. 
19 I assume the parties have decided that they want the CISG to apply to their agreement. The fact 
the parties would choose to put in a choice of law clause to supplement the CISG suggests the conscious 
choice to keep the CISG as operative law. As a general matter this makes sense as the CISG works well 
across legal cultures and it has been well worn through the cases, arbitrations, and literature to have a 
fairly firm set of interpretations, so that for the purpose of understanding the provisions, one would not 
feel left out in the woods at night. Throughout this Article I assume that the choice of retaining the CISG 
as the law governing an international sale of goods contract often is a wise choice. The purpose of this 
Article is to examine areas within the CISG where parties may want to clarify its provisions to eliminate 
possible ambiguities as to rights and obligations. 
20 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], Model Clauses for 
the Use of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2013, https://www 
.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/upicc-model-clauses. 
21 Id. at 16. The question whether the UNIDROIT Principles are “law” within the meaning of that 
term for the purpose of an enforceable choice of law provision is beyond the scope of this Article. For the 
purpose of this analysis, I assume the Principles are “law.” 
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This model choice of law clause is intended to provide certainty to those 
contractual questions from the transaction that are outside the scope of the 
CISG,22 and this model choice of law clause was specifically drafted to 
accommodate Article 7(2) of the CISG.23 Thus, with the use of this choice of 
law clause, the Principles should only apply to fill in the gaps left by the 
CISG. Yet, there are analytical complexities hidden in the use of this form 
model clause designed specifically for a choice of law in addition to the 
CISG. 
If one assumes that the UNIDROIT Principles are not the “general 
principles” on which the CISG relies, then one must first determine what the 
scope of the CISG is, in order to determine at what point the UNIDROIT 
Principles can serve to supplement the CISG. This depends on whether one 
determines the CISG is the black-letter text alone or whether the CISG is the 
black-letter text as understood and supplemented by the legions of 
interpretations that already exist to define the general principles on which it 
is based. As those lines are inconsistent among the cases and commentary, it 
is not clear how one is to pick and choose among the differing views. 
If one assumes the UNIDROIT Principles are the “general principles” 
on which the CISG is based, in order to determine at what point the text of 
CISG itself ends and the “general principles” become operative, a 
determination has to be made as to what the text of the CISG encompasses. 
One must ask, “is this the black-letter text alone or is it the black-letter text 
as understood and supplemented by the case law interpreting the CISG?” The 
line between supplementing and interpreting the CISG under Articles 7(2) 
and 7(1) quickly blurs.24 Thus the line between using the UNIDROIT 
Principles to supplement or interpret the CISG is difficult to delineate. 
This gets complicated. Does a text have to be interpreted to determine 
the exact boundaries of it for the purpose of determining whether another text 
should be consulted to interpret the initial text? 
This whole issue is much too subtle and nuanced to realistically expect 
any attorney, judge or arbitrator to feel confident in her ability to resolve it. 
I do not mean to suggest that a choice of law provision does not serve an 
important function or is not necessary. I only suggest that a choice of law 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 18. 
24 See, e.g., SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9. 
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clause alone will not resolve the interpretative ambiguity built into the CISG 
as to what constitutes the “general principles” on which the CISG is based.25 
III. INTERPRETING THE CISG 
Determining the scope of the CISG is only part of the exercise in 
delineating the meaning of the CISG. The other part is how to interpret the 
text of the Convention itself 
A. The CISG is Mostly Default Rules 
The CISG, like most sales or commercial codes, primarily provides 
default rules for those terms that parties do not have a need to negotiate or 
modify. These default rules serve an important function in commercial law; 
default terms minimize transaction costs by allowing parties to contract 
without having to negotiate individual contracts. As to the utility of default 
terms in individual contracts, we can roughly divide up sales contracts into 
three archetypes. 
First, there is the non-negotiated, non-form agreement that makes up the 
bulk of day-to-day contracting. This is the bread and butter of default contract 
rules that are provided by, for example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.26 These default rules provide broad and comprehensive background 
rules to allow people to shop at the supermarket without having to negotiate 
the terms and conditions of a contract to purchase a bunch of bananas and 
some cat food. With the rapid development of e-commerce internationally, 
there has been a corresponding rise in the number of fairly routine 
international sales agreements that neither need nor rely on form agreements 
or fully negotiated contracts. The default provisions of the CISG provide a 
convenient legal background for the common factual issues of performance 
and remedies that comprise the bulk of disputes among these transactions. 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 Addressing this very question, Professor John Honnold suggested that these close questions 
should be resolved in favor of applying the Convention. JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 60.4 (2d ed. 1991). This, 
however, seems more aspirational than realistic, and if nothing else, his solution highlights the problem. 
26 U.C.C. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
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Parties that enter into an international sales agreement governed by the 
CISG with neither a standard form on either side nor a negotiated agreement 
are operating on blind faith that some law will govern their transaction. These 
parties assume the risk that goes with any contract governed almost solely by 
default terms. The CISG is, of course, designed for such a transaction. But to 
provide for this result, the CISG necessarily must provide the most general 
and generic rules.27 
The second type of contract is the standard form contract that is intended 
to be used for multiple repeat transactions. These would include both the one-
party form agreements as well as the multiform battle of the forms among 
commercial parties. 
The third type of contract is the negotiated agreements in which both 
parties participate in developing and agreeing upon the terms. It is the second 
type of agreement as well as the third type of agreement where the reliance 
of the default rules of the CISG raise significant issues. The latter two types 
of agreements, agreements in which the parties consciously choose whether 
to have the CISG govern their transaction, are the focus of this Article. 
B. Interpreting the CISG: Article 7(1) 
To fully understand the CISG, once the scope of the CISG have been 
determined, there is also the need to interpret the meaning of the CISG itself. 
As guidance, CISG Article 7(1) sets forth two interpretative guidelines. First, 
CISG Article 7(1) provides for the autonomous interpretation of the CISG. 
Second, CISG Article 7(1) also mandates the uniformity of the application of 
the CISG. 
“Autonomous interpretation” of the Convention means that the 
Convention should be interpreted in light of other cases and arbitral decisions 
that have interpreted the CISG.28 In other words, the Convention should not 
be interpreted by using domestic law; instead, interpretation should be self-
referential. The purpose is to provide a consistent body of interpretations that 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 This is the case with any law that governs contracts for the sale of goods. Although the CISG 
may differ in important ways from an otherwise applicable domestic law, parties who are oblivious to or 
not concerned with the law that governs their transaction are not in a position to complain later about how 
this law handles their agreement. This Article focuses on those transactions where parties consciously 
choose whether to have the CISG govern their transaction. 
28 HENRY DEEB GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 2009). 
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create a uniform understanding of the CISG based on its intended application 
to international commercial transactions. 
Whether “autonomous interpretation” is practically achievable can be 
best understood by the relationship of “autonomous interpretation” with its 
parallel mandate for the uniformity of interpretation. The autonomous body 
of cases that interpret the CISG should be the basis for a uniformity of 
interpretation. Questions of interpretation should be resolved from this 
limited body of material and not be subject to interpretations based on law 
outside the CISG. This ideally should create an ex ante understanding of how 
the Convention will universally be understood, thereby providing 
international parties with some level of certainty of the meaning of the 
Convention. 
This goal of uniformity of interpretation makes sense both theoretically 
and practically. An international instrument designed for international use 
should be easily understood in a uniform manner irrespective of the location 
of the parties. But this goal was never realistic. With currently ninety-two 
countries as parties to the CISG;29 parties that represent myriad legal systems, 
the inconsistencies of interpretation are legion. In other words, the 
autonomous body of CISG case law is anything other than uniform. Thus, 
not surprisingly, some courts have specifically noted that foreign opinions 
are merely persuasive and not binding.30 This appears to be less necessary as 
an issue of jurisprudence and more an issue of prudence. This is the only way 
a court can make its way through the maze of inconsistent cases. 
This problem should not be overstated. It is not insurmountable. But it 
does appear to be more of a problem than one would likely encounter in any 
domestic law. The interpretation of local law would entail neither sifting 
through cases that may be from other legal systems nor cases in other 
languages. 
The appropriate response to this problem is not necessarily to exclude 
the CISG and fall back on domestic law. Under domestic law, the problem 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 United Nations Treaty Collection, TREATIES.UN.ORG, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
30 Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co. et al., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702 (N.D. Ill. 
2004); Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 25 Feb. 2004, English translation, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
wais/db/cases2/040225i3.html; Trib. di Rimini, 26 Nov. 2002, Giur. it. 2003, I, 896, 3095 (It.), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html; Trib. di Vigevano, 12 July 2000, Giur. it. 2000, 280-90 
(It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html; Trib. di Pavia, 29 Dec. 1999, Giur. it. 2000, 932-
33 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html. 
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may be lessened, but it may still exist. As I will suggest, the problem is not 
the CISG per se, but the reliance on certain default rules within the CISG that 
can lead to uncertain results. This can be illustrated by examples. 
C. A Problematic Default Rule: CISG Article 39 Time of Notice 
To give some context to this discussion, I would like to explore CISG 
Article 39(1), which is an example of a default rule in the CISG that is a 
constant source of unnecessary litigation regarding the CISG.31 Article 39 
provides an affirmative obligation for the buyer to give the seller notice of a 
lack of conformity of the goods within a reasonable time. Failure to meet this 
requirement can have serious consequences,32 so this requirement must be 
taken seriously. 
This notice requirement raises two substantial factual questions that can 
only be articulated but not answered by the CISG. The first question is, “what 
constitutes a reasonable time to give notice?” The second question is, “what 
constitutes adequate notice?” 
As for what is a reasonable time for notice, there is no realistic way to 
provide a single time for what would be reasonable under all circumstances 
because both the nature of the goods as well as the reasonable expectations 
of the buyer and seller require that this be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
Since the question of timing is a factual one, it might be thought that the 
whole question should focus on the facts of the individual case, and therefore 
case law and arbitrations would have little to add to the specifics of the case 
at hand. Yet, this is not how the CISG has been understood. There is a myriad 
of cases upon which parties routinely rely to resolve this question. 
Moreover, a large body of case law has developed that provides for 
presumptive notice, specific time periods as guidelines or default rules.33 
This is contrary to intentional flexibility provided in the language of Article 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 CISG art. 39(1) provides: “The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods 
if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable 
time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it.” CISG art. 39(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 
U.N.T.S. 3, 66. 
32 If the buyer does not provide the seller this required notice, the buyer will have to pay the contract 
price and not reduce the price by the value of the non-conformity. 
33 UNCITRAL, 2016 DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 3, art. 39 at 177. 
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39. Yet, with the mandate of autonomous interpretation in CISG Article 7, 
one cannot be certain that these cases may not be relied upon to one’s 
detriment. 
As with the question of the timing of notification, CISG Article 39 also 
leaves open the means by which notice is to be given. The method of 
notification is properly and necessarily left to the facts of the individual 
case.34 Yet, as with the question of the time of notification, the issue of the 
proper means of notice has generated a significant number of disputes.35 
Might these questions of timing and method of notice be avoided by 
falling back on domestic law? Possibly, but this is not likely to have a 
significant effect. Thus, there are similar notice requirements in the Uniform 
Commercial Code, for example. As with the CISG, in the Uniform 
Commercial Code, what constitutes both the reasonable time and method for 
notification is fact specific to the individual case.36 As we have seen though, 
some interpretations of the CISG provide for a presumptive notice period, 
which is a concept foreign to the Uniform Commercial Code. This makes 
what might be seen as a straightforward question of fact to an American 
lawyer now subject to legal conclusions beyond the simple fact determination 
of reasonableness, and therefore subject to greater uncertainty. 
But whether there really is more uncertainty and therefore more fear in 
the use of the CISG as there would be under domestic law, the uncertainty in 
both legal regimes can easily be addressed by adding to the agreement a term 
that specifies the time and manner of the notification of default. If this term 
is provided, as to the question of notification of default, there is essentially 
no difference between the CISG and the Uniform Commercial Code (or 
presumably any other domestic law) and therefore there is no need to worry 
about the uncertainty of the CISG for this issue. 
IV. CONTRACTING AROUND DEFAULT RULES 
As the discussion on Article 39 shows, a party should easily be able to 
contract around a default rule that creates potential uncertainty. But is it 
reasonable to expect parties to contract around all of the uncertainties in the 
CISG? The answer is no. I would like to suggest that to do so is not necessary, 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 Id. at 176–77. 
35 Id. 
36 See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
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and the failure to do so is not, in and of itself, a reason to contract out of the 
CISG. 
A lawyer assisting in the agreement would consider whether the 
agreement should include clauses on choice of courts, choice of law, and 
arbitration. It is worthwhile to consider other terms in the agreement that may 
mitigate the need to worry about other aspects of the CISG. 
It should be noted that the majority of disputes among parties to 
international sales agreements are on the factual question of performance and 
remedies. For these disputes, the underlying legal rules that govern the 
transaction will have little bearing on the result of the dispute under most 
legal systems including the CISG. 
The resolution of factual disputes always entails a certain level of 
uncertainty, as that is the nature of dispute resolution. However, it is not these 
factual uncertainties that concern us. We are concerned only with those 
default rules that gauge the standard with which to measure a party’s 
obligations and that do not give clear guidance that create uncertainty as a 
legal question. 
In a contract for the international sale of goods, normally the major 
terms the contracting parties care about are price, standards for performance, 
and remedies.37 If the terms for the standards for performance and the 
remedies for non-performance are expressly set out, the underlying 
substantive law will, to a large extent, have little if any impact on the 
obligations and performance. 
The list of articles in the CISG that have been the greatest source of 
litigation is not too extensive. The following is a brief overview of those 
contentious areas. 
A. The Goods 
Failure of the parties to agree upon the goods to be sold is not an 
ambiguous or undefined term, but a failure of assent.38 In this case, there is 
no contract, and therefore no reason to be concerned with what law governs 
the non-existent contract. 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 These are terms that, if the parties do not provide for expressly, the terms will be governed by 
the default terms in the underlying law. 
38 See, e.g., SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, at 247. 
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B. The Price 
Price is a term, the absence of which, should not necessarily result in a 
failure of assent in a contract governed by the CISG.39 There is, however, 
some authority for this result. Thus, under the CISG, absent a price term, 
there is either not a contract or a factual issue about the reasonable price of 
the goods under comparable circumstances.40 
A reasonable price, if it is a question that is in dispute, is not one the 
parties have agreed upon, for if they had there would not be a dispute. The 
absence of a price term could arise either inadvertently or consciously.41 In 
either case, the result might either be a failure of assent or litigation over the 
question of a “reasonable price,” and such a result might not reflect the 
bargain that the parties might otherwise have or would have wanted. This 
potential problem is easily resolved by having a definite price term.42 
C. Title 
The CISG expressly excludes questions of property rights and title.43 
Title, though, may be important to the transaction. Title may affect the rights 
of the creditors of both the buyer and seller. Title to the goods may be 
particularly important when the transaction includes secured financing of the 
goods either by the seller or a third party. The transfer of title may be 
expressly provided for in the agreement or the parties may rely on a choice 
                                                                                                                           
 
39 CISG art. 55 provides a rule to determine price when the parties have contracted without a price 
term: 
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or make 
provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any 
indication to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally charged 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable 
circumstances in the trade concerned. 
CISG, supra note 4, art. 55, at 69. 
40 For citations and discussion of the cases that have found a price term to be mandatory, see 
UNCITRAL, 2016 DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 2, art. 14 at 87. 
41 This could happen, for example, when the parties assumed the price would be set later, either by 
the parties themselves or a third party. 
42 I assume a definite price includes a definite means of determining a price later. Expressly 
providing a means to determine the price in the future is valid under both the CISG and the U.C.C. See 
CISG, supra note 1, art. 55 at 69, and U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
43 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(b) at 60. 
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of law clause that governs issues outside of the CISG. Either way, it is 
important to align the transfer of title to the relevant requirements of the 
applicable law of secured transactions if a security right is taken in the goods. 
For parties that routinely rely on domestic law, the issue of title might 
not be an issue routinely addressed in the sales agreement as the transfer of 
title may be embedded in the domestic law.44 It is perilous not to provide for 
the issue of title in a transaction governed by the CISG. 
D. Formation 
Formation is rarely an issue in a contract dispute. Once performance has 
begun, most disputes about the existence of the contract are moot. Moreover, 
most disagreements arising under the CISG are based on either the quality or 
the absence of performance or on the appropriate remedy upon default. Yet, 
formation issues can arise. These can easily be addressed to avoid potential 
problems. 
Agreements should be in writing or by an electronic substitute. 
Although the CISG has no form requirements,45 writings or the electronic 
equivalents provide evidence of the existence of offers, acceptances, 
agreements, and the terms of the agreement. Relying on an oral agreement 
for an international contract for the sale of goods invites disputes on both the 
existence as well as the terms of a contract. 
The CISG provides clear legal guidance on contract formation. This 
includes rules on the effectiveness of offers,46 acceptances,47 revocations48 
and rejections,49 and counter-offers.50 These rules, though, assume that the 
facts and timing of dispatch and receipt will be clearly identifiable. This may 
not be the case, particularly with the use of electronic communications. This 
potential problem is easily avoided by clearly specifying in an offer the 
method and timing for when acceptance occurs. 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 This would certainly be the case in American law. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2012). 
45 CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 at 61. 
46 Id. art. 15. 
47 Id. art. 18. 
48 Id. art. 16. 
49 Id. art. 17. 
50 Id. art. 19. 
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The CISG also allows for contract formation by conduct.51 But such an 
agreement runs the risk of leaving a number of terms undecided, and 
therefore, subject to the default provisions of the CISG, that may not 
necessarily reflect the parties’ true intent.52 The agreement should specify the 
means by which the agreement is to be accepted and not leave this open to 
acceptance by performance. 
E. Fundamental Breach and Other Grounds for Refusing Goods 
The CISG provides that: 
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results 
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and 
a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have 
foreseen such a result.53 
A fundamental breach gives the non-breaching party the right to avoid 
the contract and suspend its own obligation to perform.54 A breach that is not 
fundamental still allows the non-breaching party the right to damages, but 
that party’s obligation to render its own performance is not suspended.55 
As a default rule, “fundamental breach” raises two questions of concern 
to contracting parties. First, what constitutes a “fundamental breach?” 
Second, does the standard for a fundamental breach reflect the standard of 
performance the parties would choose for the suspension of their contractual 
obligations? 
As for the meaning of “fundamental breach,” although the CISG is 
intended to be interpreted autonomously, many decisions have relied on 
domestic statutes and cases to determine its meaning.56 Moreover, even those 
decisions that have consciously attempted to stay within the framework of 
“autonomously interpreting” the language of CISG Article 25 have often 
found the general language of the section vague enough to prevent any clear 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Id. art. 14(1), 18(1). 
52 This issue often arises when there is a battle of the forms. 
53 CISG, supra note 1, art. 25 at 3. 
54 A non-fundamental breach allows the non-breaching party the right to damages for the breach, 
but does not allow the non-breaching party to suspect its performance. 
55 See, e.g., SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, at 420. 
56 Id. at 423. 
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guidance. This has resulted in disparate interpretations, such that even the 
question of whether late delivery might constitute a fundamental breach is 
unclear.57 Reliance on the cases, then, may not shed much light on how this 
Article will be understood under a specific set of facts. 
As to whether a “fundamental breach” is the standard that actually 
reflects the expectation and desires of the parties to allow the suspension of 
performance, that is another question that the parties should resolve. The 
default standard of the CISG is not universal. For example, under American 
domestic law, the default standards to allow the buyer to suspend 
performance is any deviation of the goods from the contract specifications.58 
Both of these standards, although different, purport to reflect the normal 
expectation of buyers. This suggests that neither default standard is likely to 
truly comport with the expectations of many contracting parties. 
Both the potential ambiguity of the meaning of fundamental breach, as 
well as the possibility that it does not represent the parties’ desire for the 
standard for termination, suggests that the standard of “fundamental breach” 
may not reflect the bargain the parties would intend. To avoid these 
problems, parties should provide an express standard for the right to suspend 
performance.59 
F. Implied Obligations 
The CISG provides for implied seller obligations: 
(a) Are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used; 
(b) Are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to 
the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him 
to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgement.60 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 For a discussion of cases providing contrary authority, see UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 114–17 ( 2016 Edition). 
58 U.C.C. § 2-601 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
59 Because a party declaring a fundamental breach must give the other party notice of this 
declaration, it is wise to resolve the factual questions of what form, content and timing is necessary for 
meeting the notice requirement. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 26. 
60 CISG, supra note 1, art. 35. 
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These implied obligations raise two potential concerns for contracting 
parties, one interpretative and one factual. 
First, these obligations have not been given a consistent legal meaning. 
These implied obligations are similar to those contained in some domestic 
laws,61 and contrary to the concept of autonomous interpretation, it is not 
uncommon for some courts to view the CISG through the lens of domestic 
law.62 This creates some uncertainty as to the legal meaning of these 
obligations, as the cases interpreting these obligations do not create an 
autonomous view of the implied obligations under the CISG, but create a 
pastiche of various domestic codes and cases that address the scope of 
implied obligations under local law.63 
Second, it is also unclear what “fit for the ordinary purpose” will mean 
factually in any specific case. Thus, not only the question of what is an 
“ordinary purpose” may be disputed, but how long goods should function 
under this standard, is also subject to dispute. 
To avoid both the ambiguities of the language of these obligations, as 
well as the factual application of the requirement that goods are “fit for the 
ordinary purpose,” sellers might be advised to expressly disclaim these 
obligations and replace the seller’s obligations with express statements of 
quality and performance. 
G. Express Obligations 
Thus far, I have emphasized the danger of relying on the default terms 
of the CISG. Many of these problems can be ameliorated by express terms. 
There are, however, several persistent problems that arise with express 
obligation terms that might be clarified in the agreement. 
It is common for agreements to provide for the goods to meet certain 
externally determined standards, such as safety, health and quality. With 
international sales agreements, it is not uncommon for these standards to vary 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 ((AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (American Law); Sale 
of Goods Act 1895 (W. Austl.), article 14 (Austl.) (Australian Law). 
62 For a discussion of cases relying on domestic law, see UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW, supra note 57, at 141–42. That at least some courts have difficulty distinguishing the implied 
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among countries.64 Parties should clarify which domestic or international 
standards govern. 
The CISG does not address the question of which party bears the burden 
of proving non-conformity.65 The decisions have not been unified on whether 
this is a question of domestic law or whether this is a question to be 
determined within the CISG itself. Even among those cases that have found 
that this issue is within the scope of the CISG itself, there is not uniformity. 
The agreement can specify this respective obligation. 
H. The Meaning of Terms in the Agreement 
The CISG provides a rule for the interpretation of the terms in the 
agreement: 
Article 8 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other 
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was. 
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that 
a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the 
same circumstances. 
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable 
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the 
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct 
of the parties.66 
This Article provides a broad rule for the interpretation of the terms of 
the agreement. Despite some contrary authority,67 Article 8 does not provide 
for the application of the common law parol evidence rule to exclude 
evidence as to the meaning of the terms in the final written or electronic 
agreement.68 There is nothing in the CISG, however, that prevents the 
enforceability of a merger clause to exclude evidence of additional terms to 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 143–44. 
66 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8. 
67 See, e.g., Beijing Metals & Minerals Imp./Exp. Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178 (5th 
Cir. 1993). 
68 GABRIEL, supra note 28, at 70. 
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the agreement, and parties are advised to take advantage of this possibility to 
avoid claims of additional terms that were not included in the formal 
agreement. 
I. Payment 
There are three issues regarding payment that are relevant but 
unanswered in the CISG: the method of payment, the currency of payment, 
and interest. 
1. Method of Payment 
The CISG provides the obligation to pay; it does not provide the method 
for payment.69 Payments in international sales transactions vary from the 
traditional bill of exchange to more modern electronic payments such as wire 
transfers. Payment against documents of title are still a common means of 
payment for goods sold internationally. Letters of credit are widely used to 
shift the risk of payment from the buyer to a bank. Issues of currency controls 
may be relevant. 
If the parties do not expressly provide for the method of payment, and a 
method cannot be ascertained by CISG Articles 8 or 9, then the CISG 
provides no answer for the method of payment, and it would be determined 
under the applicable domestic rule determined by private international law or 
other law designated by a choice of law clause. These issues on the method 
of payment can easily be resolved by a term in the agreement. 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 The CISG does provide default rules to the time and place of payment. See CISG supra note 4, 
arts. 57, 58. 
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2. Currency 
In a domestic transaction, the currency is usually assumed to be the 
domestic currency. No such assumption can be made in an international sale. 
The failure of the parties to specify the currency of payment may lead to an 
unnecessary dispute, particularly when there are fluctuating exchange rates. 
The cases are not consistent on whether the question is one that is answered 
by the CISG or by the otherwise applicable domestic law.70 Neither approach 
is particularly straightforward. 
If it is determined that the question is one of domestic law, absent a 
choice of law clause that governs issues outside of the CISG, the analysis 
will inevitably result in having to apply the rules of private international 
law.71 This will result in a presumption under local law that may not reflect 
the expectations of both parties. 
The cases that have determined that currency is an issue that can be 
determined from the CISG itself have done so inconsistently, often finding 
that the currency should be based on the place of the seller’s place of 
business72 or the place where the goods are to be delivered.73 It should be 
obvious that neither the place of the seller’s business nor the place where the 
goods are to be delivered necessarily reflects what expectations one could 
assume the parties would have for the currency of payment. To avoid a 
dispute on this easily resolved issue, the currency of payment should be 
specified in the agreement. 
3. Interest 
The CISG provides that, “[i]f a party fails to pay the price or any other 
sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it.”74 The rate 
of interest, however, is not provided for in the CISG because no rate could 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 UNCITRAL, supra note 33, at 257. 
71 Once a domestic law is determined, it is common for domestic laws to provide for payment in 
the currency of the place of the seller’s business. See Italy v. Switzerland, No. C1 06 95, CLOUT, Apr. 27, 
2007, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070427s1.html. 
72 UNCITRAL, supra note 33, at 257. 
73 Id. 
74 See CISG, supra note 4, art. 78. 
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be agreed upon during the negotiations leading up to its adoption.75 Some 
cases have determined that the rate is to be determined by the applicable 
domestic law that is applicable under the rules of private international law,76 
others by the law of the jurisdiction of the creditor,77 and others by the law 
of the jurisdiction of the currency of payment.78 The interest rate should be 
expressly provided for in the agreement. 
J. Remedies 
As with other legal regimes, the remedial structure in the CISG provides 
general rules, and as such, it may not reflect the desires or expectations of the 
parties. The parties may approach this by contractually providing the 
remedial structure that fits the transaction. The remedies that have been the 
most contentious and therefore might be considered for contractual 
clarification and modification are specific performance, consequential 
damages, and limited remedies. 
1. Specific Performance 
The CISG provides for specific performance as a default remedy.79 To 
assuage the common law contingency among the drafters, the CISG also 
provides that a court that would not otherwise enforce an award of specific 
performance under its domestic law, need not do so under the CISG.80 
There has been little litigation, though, under either of these Articles.81 
This is due, to a large extent, to the difficulty in obtaining and enforcing the 
right. Buyers often find it more advantageous to get replacement goods if 
possible and then pursue a remedy of damages. This is particularly true when 
the buyer needs the goods quickly. 
                                                                                                                           
 
75 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, at 1111–12. 
76 UNCITRAL, supra note 33, at 365. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.; see also Volker Behr, Symposium—Ten Years of the United Nations Sales Convention: The 
Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting to Problems in Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 263 
(1998). 
79 CISG, supra note 4, art. 46(1). 
80 CISG, supra note 4, art. 28. 
81 See CLOUT re: 46(1) and 28. 
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The award of specific performance usually requires a two-step process. 
First, there needs to be a judgment or arbitral award. Second, this judgment 
or award must be enforced. These two steps may be in different jurisdictions. 
The legal process necessary to enforce an award of specific performance, 
depending on the jurisdiction or jurisdictions, may be lengthy and 
procedurally complicated. 
If the jurisdiction that is likely to be the forum is a common law 
jurisdiction, the buyer may have some difficulty even getting an award for 
specific performance. This might possibly be mitigated by a clause in the 
agreement specifically providing for specific performance, and common law 
courts have become more inured to awarding specific performance when the 
parties allocate that risk in the agreement.82 Yet, there is still some reluctance 
by common law courts to award specific performance. For these reasons, 
specific performance as a remedy will often require some very exacting 
contracting for the choice of forum and an expedited means of enforcement 
to provide for the most expedient means to achieve this result. 
The difficulties in getting specific performance are not limited to the 
CISG. The difficulties exist regardless of the governing law because of the 
procedures necessary to get this remedy. To the extent the buyer may need 
the remedy of specific performance, having the CISG as the governing law 
will likely neither help nor hinder. This is still an issue that parties may 
consider providing for in the agreement to allow an expedited means for 
specific performance. 
2. Consequential Damages and the Limitation of Remedies 
The inclusive right to damages in the CISG is packed into one Article: 
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. 
Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought 
to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the 
facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible 
consequence of the breach of contract.83 
                                                                                                                           
 
82 See, e.g., GABRIEL, supra note 28, at 170. 
83 CISG, supra note 4, art. 74. 
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Within this Article, courts have found, among the types of damages, the 
right to consequential damages,84 lost profits,85 losses arising from the change 
in the value of money,86 losses from death and personal injury,87 and 
attorney’s fees.88 In addition to the losses incurred because of the diminished 
value of the goods themselves, this potential list encompasses a wide array 
of damages that might be well beyond the risk that the parties may be willing 
to or have assume to have undertaken in the agreement. 
This default provision, however, as with comparable domestic laws, 
does not necessarily reflect the risk the parties are willing to assume in the 
agreement. For example, although consequential economic damages, such as 
lost profits, is the default position of the CISG, these damages are commonly 
excluded damages in sales agreements. It is also common for the seller to 
limit remedies further by providing a limited remedy such as repair or 
replace. Among the most important terms in the agreement are the terms that 
lay out the remedial structure of the agreement. As with much of the CISG, 
parties can avoid the uncertainties in the interpretation of and obligations 
created by the default remedial provisions by expressly providing for the 
remedies when there is a default. 
K. Dispute Resolution 
The potential unknowns when there is a dispute are too great to list in 
this Article. With an international contract for the sale of goods governed by 
the CISG, generally the unknowns are what court, what law other than the 
CISG, and what method of dispute resolution will prevail. A choice of law 
and choice of court or arbitration clause should eliminate these 
uncertainties.89 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 UNCITRAL, supra note 33, at 335. 
85 This is, of course, expressly provided for in article 74. CISG, supra note 4, art. 74. 
86 UNCITRAL, supra note 33, at 335. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 336. 
89 Under some legal systems, there are limits to both the ability to choose a court or a specific law. 
I assume any party that would take the advice I have given so far in this Article would understand and 
adjust for these risks. Tort liability and non-privity obligations, as well as other mandatory obligations 
probably cannot be disclaimed or modified by contract or be contracted around, and to the extent that they 
cannot, the choice of law governing the sales contract will neither help nor hinder the parties regarding 
these obligations. 
358 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 38:333 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.199 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although parties should recognize what substantive law governs their 
agreement, the significance of this choice is likely to be minor if the parties 
reflect in the agreement how they would resolve those issues that are likely 
to arise in a dispute. If, as I suggest, parties should provide express resolution 
of these issues, one might ask why the parties should otherwise rely on the 
CISG as the underlying sales law for those issues to which the parties do not 
provide. In other words, why should parties not simply opt out of the CISG 
and rely on a domestic law? The answer to this, I believe, goes to the very 
nature and purpose of the CISG. The CISG may be porous in its scope and 
rules of interpretation, but the CISG does serve two important functions that 
should not be easily dismissed. First, the CISG is based on the expectations 
of parties to international transactions; an expectation not built into any 
domestic law. Second, the use of the CISG does not require a party to 
understand the counterparty’s domestic law. One may have to learn the 
CISG, but that is an equal burden upon both parties that favors neither. 
Thoughtful parties need not opt out of the CISG. 
